Abstract. We present some results about generics for computable Mathias forcing. The n-generics and weak n-generics in this setting form a strict hierarchy as in the case of Cohen forcing. We analyze the complexity of the Mathias forcing relation, and show that if G is any n-generic with n ≥ 3 then it satisfies the jump property G (n−1) = G ′ ⊕ ∅ (n) . We prove that every such G has generalized high degree, and so cannot have even Cohen 1-generic degree. On the other hand, we show that G, together with any bi-immune set A ≤ T ∅ (n−1) , computes a Cohen n-generic set.
Introduction
Forcing has been a central technique in computability theory since it was introduced (in the form we now call Cohen forcing) by Kleene and Post to exhibit a degree strictly between 0 and 0 ′ . The study of the algorithmic properties of Cohen generic sets, and of the structure of their degrees, has long been a rich source of problems and results. In the present paper, we propose to undertake a similar investigation of generic sets for (computable) Mathias forcing, and present some of our initial results in this direction.
Mathias forcing was perhaps first used in computability theory by Soare in [10] to build a set with no subset of strictly higher degree. Subsequently, it became a prominent tool for constructing infinite homogeneous sets for computable colorings of pairs of integers, as in Seetapun and Slaman [8] , Cholak, Jockusch, and Slaman [2] , and Dzhafarov and Jockusch [4] . It has also found applications in algorithmic randomness, in Binns, Kjos-Hanssen, Lerman, and Solomon [1] .
We show below that a number of results for Cohen generics hold also for Mathias generics, and that a number of others do not. The main point of distinction is that neither the set of conditions, nor the forcing relation is computable, so many usual techniques do not carry over. We begin with background in Section 2, and present some preliminary results in Section 3. In Section 4 we characterize the complexity of the forcing relation, and in Section 5 we prove a number of results about the degrees of Mathias generic sets, and about their relationship to Cohen generic degrees. We indicate questions along the way we hope will be addressed in future work.
Definitions
We assume familiarity with the terminology particular to Cohen forcing. (For background on computability theory, see [9] . For background on Cohen generic
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sets, see Section 1.24 of [3] .) The purpose of this section is to set down the precise analogues for Mathias forcing. These are standard, but their formalizations in the setting of computability theory require some care. A slightly different presentation is given in [1, Section 6], over which ours has the benefit of reducing the complexity of the set of conditions from Σ 0 3 to Π 0 2 . Definition 2.1.
(1) A (computable Mathias) pre-condition is a pair (D, E) where D is a finite set, E is a computable set, and max D < min E.
By an index for a pre-condition (D, E) we shall mean a pair (d, e) such that d is the canonical index of D and E = {x : Φ e (x) ↓= 1}. In particular, if E is finite, Φ e need not be total. This definition makes the set of all indices Π 0 1 , but we can pass to a computable subset containing an index for every pre-condition. Namely, define a strictly increasing computable function g by
Then the set of pairs of the form (d, g(d, e)) is computable, and each is an index for a pre-condition. Moreover, if (d, e) is an index as well, then it and (d, g(d, e)) index the same pre-condition. Formally, all references to pre-conditions in the sequel will be to indices from this set, and we shall treat D and E as numbers when convenient.
Note that whether one pre-condition extends another is a Π 0 2 question. By adopting the convention that for all e and x, if Φ e (x) ↓ then Φ e (y) ↓∈ {0, 1} for all y ≤ x, the same question for conditions becomes Π In what follows, a Σ 0 n set of conditions refers to a Σ 0 n -definable set of preconditions, each of which is a condition. (Note that this is not the same as the set of all conditions satisfying a given Σ 0 n definition, as discussed further in the next section.) As usual, we call such a set dense if it contains an extension of every condition.
(1) A set A meets a set C of conditions if it satisfies some member of C. We call a degree generic if it contains a set that is n-generic for all n.
It is easy to see that for every n ≥ 2, there exists a Mathias n-generic
. This is done just as in Cohen forcing, but as there is no computable listing of Σ 0 n sets of conditions, one goes through the Σ 0 n sets of pre-conditions and checks which of these consist of conditions alone. We pass to some other basic properties of generics. We shall refer to Mathias n-generics below simply as n-generics when no confusion is possible.
Basic results
Note that the set of all conditions is Π 0 2 . Thus, the set of conditions satisfying a given Σ 0 n definition is Σ 0 n if n ≥ 3, and Σ 0 3 otherwise. For n < 3, we may thus wish to consider the following stronger form of genericity, which has no analogue in the case of Cohen forcing. Definition 3.1. A set G is strongly n-generic if, for every Σ 0 n -definable set of preconditions C, either G meets some condition in C or G meets the set of conditions not extended by any condition in C. Proposition 3.2. For n ≥ 3, a set is strongly n-generic if and only if it is ngeneric. For n ≤ 2, a set is strongly n-generic if and only if it is 3-generic.
Proof. Evidently, every strongly n-generic set is n-generic. Now suppose C is a Σ 0 n set of pre-conditions, and let C ′ consist of all the conditions in C. An infinite set meets or avoids C if and only if it meets or avoids C ′ , so every max{n, 3}-generic set meets or avoids C. For n ≥ 3, this means that every n-generic set is strongly n-generic, and for n ≤ 2 that every 3-generic set is strongly n-generic.
It remains to show that every strongly 0-generic set is 3-generic. Let C be a given Σ 0 3 set of conditions, and let R be a computable relation such that (D, E) belongs to C if and only if (∃a)(∀x)(∃y)R(D, E, a, x, y). Define a strictly increasing computable function g by
and let C ′ be the computable set of all pre-conditions of the form (D, g(D, E, a)). If (D, E) ∈ C then Φ E is total and so there is an a such that Φ g(D,E,a) = Φ E . If, on the other hand, (D, E) is a pre-condition not in C then for each a there is an x such that Φ g(D,E,a) (x) ↑. Thus, the members of C are precisely the conditions in C ′ , so an infinite set meets or avoids one if and only if it meets or avoids the other. In particular, every strongly 0-generic set meets or avoids C.
As a consequence, we shall restrict ourselves to 3-genericity or higher from now on. Without further qualification, n below will always be a number ≥ 3. Proposition 3.3. Every n-generic set is weakly n-generic, and every weakly ngeneric set is (n − 1)-generic.
Proof. The first implication is clear. For the second, let a Σ 0 n−1 set C of conditions be given. Let D be the class of all conditions that are either in C or else have no extension in C, which is clearly dense. If n ≥ 4, then D is easily seen to be Σ 0 n (actually Π 0 n−1 ) since saying a condition (D, E) has no extension in C is expressed as
If n = 3, this makes D appear to be Σ 0 4 but since C is a set of conditions only, we can re-write the above line as
which gives a Σ 0 3 definition. In either case, then, a weakly n-generic set must meet D, and hence must either meet or avoid C.
The proof of the following proposition is straightforward.
Proposition 3.4. Every weakly n-generic set G is hyperimmune relative to ∅ (n−1) . If G is n-generic, then its degree forms a minimal pair with 0 (n−1) .
Corollary 3.5. Not every n-generic set is weakly (n + 1)-generic.
Proof. Take any n-generic G ≤ T ∅ (n) . Then G is not hyperimmune relative to ∅ (n+1) , and so cannot be weakly (n + 1)-generic.
We shall separate weakly n-generic sets from n-generic sets in Section 5, thereby obtaining a strictly increasing sequence of genericity notions weakly 3-generic ⇐= 3-generic ⇐= weakly 4-generic ⇐= · · · as in the case of Cohen forcing. In many other respects, however, the two types of genericity are very different. For instance, as noted in [2, Section 4.1], every Mathias generic G is cohesive, i.e., satisfies G ⊆ * W or G ⊆ * W for every computably enumerable set W . In particular, if we write 
follows that no Mathias generic can have even Cohen 2-generic degree. The same argument does not prevent a Mathias n-generic from having Cohen 1-generic degree, as there are high 1-generic sets, but we prove in Corollary 5.6 that this does not happen either.
The forcing relation
Much of the discrepancy between Mathias and Cohen genericity stems from the fact that the complexity of forcing a formula, defined below, does not agree with the complexity of the formula.
We regard every Σ 0 0 formula ϕ as being written in disjunctive normal form according to some fixed effective procedure for doing so. Let n ϕ denote the number of disjuncts. For each i < n ϕ , let P ϕ,i be the set of all n such that n ∈ X is a conjunct of the ith disjunct, and let N ϕ,i be the set of all n such that n / ∈ X is a conjunct of the ith disjunct. Canonical indices for these sets can be found uniformly effectively from an index for ϕ. (
So
Writing θ a (X) for the formula θ(a, X), let D ′ = D ∪ F and
and so θ(a, D ′′ ) cannot force θ(a, G). Thus (D, E) does not force ϕ(G). The rest of 2 follows immediately, since forcing a formula that is Σ 0 1 over another formula is Σ 0 1 over the complexity of forcing that formula. We next prove 3 for n = 2. Suppose that ϕ(G) ≡ (∀x)(∃y)θ(x, y, X) where θ is Σ 0 0 . Our claim is that (D, E) ϕ(G) if and only if, for every a and every condition (D ′ , E ′ ) extending (D, E), there is a finite F ⊂ E ′ and a number k > max F such that 
. Thus, if we let k = max N θ a,b ,i , we obtain (1).
To complete the proof, we prove 3 and 4 for n ≥ 3 by simultaneous induction on n. Clearly, 3 for n − 1 implies 4 for n, so we already have 4 for n = 3. Now assume 4 for some n ≥ 3. The definition of forcing a Π 0 n+1 statement is easily seen to be Π 
Degrees of Mathias generics
We begin here with a jump property for Mathias generics similar to that of Jockusch for Cohen generics. It follows that the degrees d satisfying
yield a strict hierarchy of subclasses of the high degrees.
, we wish to decide every Σ 0,G n−1 sentences using G ′ ⊕ ∅ (n) . Let ϕ 0 (X), ϕ 1 (X), . . ., be a computable enumeration of all Σ 0 n−1 sentences in exactly one free set variable, and for each i let C i be the set of conditions forcing ϕ i (G), and D i the set of conditions forcing ¬ϕ(G). Then D i is the set of conditions with no extension in C i , so if G meets C i it cannot also meet D i . On the other hand, if G avoids C i then it meets D i by definition. Now by Lemma 4.3, each C i is Σ 0 n since n ≥ 3, and so it is met or avoided by G. Thus, for each i, either G meets C i , in which case ϕ(G) holds by Proposition 4.4, or else G meets D i , in which case ¬ϕ(G) holds by Remark 4.5. To conclude the proof, we observe that G ′ ⊕ ∅ (n) can decide, uniformly in i, whether G meets C i or D i . Indeed, from a given i, indices for C i and D i (as a Σ 0 n set and a Π 0 n set, respectively) can be found uniformly computably, and then ∅ (n) has only to produce these sets until a condition in one is found that is satisfied by G, which can in turn be determined by G ′ .
Corollary 5.2. For every n ≥ 2 there is a Π 0 n formula in exactly one free set variable, the relation of forcing which is not ∆ 0 n+1 . For n ≥ 3, there is also a Σ 0 n such formula.
Proof. By the proof of Lemma 4.3, the second part implies the first, so it suffices to prove it. If forcing every Σ 0 n formula ϕ(X) were ∆ 0 n+1 , then the proof of Theorem
could be carried out computably in
The following result is the analogue of Theorem 2.3 of Kurtz [7] that every A > T ∅ (n−1) hyperimmune relative to ∅ (n−1) is Turing equivalent to the (n − 1)st jump of a weakly Cohen n-generic set. The proof, although mostly similar, requires a few important modifications. The main problem is in coding B into A (n−2) , which, in the case of Cohen forcing, is done by appending long blocks of 1s to the strings under construction. As the infinite part of a Mathias condition can be made very sparse, we cannot use the same idea here. We highlight the changes below, and sketch the rest of the details.
for some weakly n-generic set G.
Proof. Computably in A, we build a sequence of conditions 
by forcing the jump, in the usual manner. Finally, let k be the number of stages t < s such that
, and otherwise set (D s+1 , E s+1 ) = (D s , E s ). By definition, the B i must intersect every computable set infinitely often, and so the entire construction is A-computable. That G = s D s is weakly n-generic can be verified much like in Kurtz's proof, but using the ∅ (n−1) -computable function h where h(s) is the least t so that for each (D, E) with D, E ≤ s there exists b ≤ t in
′ being forced during the construction and thus being A-computable. Finally, to show A ≤ T G (n−2) , let s 0 < s 1 < · · · be all the stages
, the least b ∈ G−D s k must belong to some B i , and since G (n−2) computes ∅ (n−1) it can tell which B i . Then 
And this b is in B 1 or B 0 depending as k is or is not in B.
Corollary 5.4. Not every weakly n-generic set is (n + 1)-generic.
Proof. By the previous proposition, ∅ (n) ≡ T G (n−2) for some weakly n-generic set G. By Theorem 5.1, if G were n-generic we would have
, which cannot be.
In spite of Theorem 5.1, we are still left with the possibility that some Mathias n-generic set has Cohen 1-generic degree. We now show that this cannot happen.
This is thus a Σ 0 2 relation, as forcing
, is equivalent to (D, E) having no finite extension that forces i ∈ (G ⊕ ∅ ′ ) ′ , and hence is Π 0 2 . That forcing implies this fact is clear. In the other direction, suppose (D, E) does not force i / ∈ (G ⊕ ∅ ′ ) ′ , and so has an extension (
Let σ witness this fact, as above. Then if P and N consist of the x < |σ| such that σ(2x) = 1 and σ(2x) = 0, respectively, σ witnesses that
and D i is Π 
, and that no such degree can be GH 1 . It was shown by Jockusch and Posner [6, Corollary 7] that every GL 2 degree computes a Cohen 1-generic set. Hence, we obtain the following: Corollary 5.6. Every Mathias n-generic set has GL m degree for all m ≥ 1. Hence, it is not of Cohen 1-generic degree, but it does compute a Cohen 1-generic.
The corollary leaves open the following question, which we have so far been unable to answer. The subsequent results give partial answers. It follows, for example, that the join of G with any non-computable S ≤ T ∅ ′ computes a Cohen n-generic. Our last result shows that the kind of coding employed in the above theorem cannot be used also for S = ∅.
Proposition 5.9. If G is Mathias n-generic and H is Cohen n-generic then H is not many-one reducible to G.
Proof. Seeking a contradiction, suppose f is a computable function such that f (H) ⊆ G and f (H) ⊆ G. Since G is cohesive and ran(f ) is c.e., and since H is non-computable, it follows that G ⊆ * ran(f ). Thus, for all sufficiently large a,
We conclude that G ≤ T H, and hence that G ≡ T H. But this contradicts our observation at the end of Section 3 that no Mathias n-generic can have Cohen n-generic degree.
